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Highlights:  14 
• Drivers’ perceptions of oncoming trains and decision making regarding their crossing 15 
behaviours were examined 16 
• Drivers identified the presence of trains 2km away and their movement at 1.6km 17 
away, with high variability between participants 18 
• Most participants underestimated the speed of oncoming trains, particularly when 19 
they were travelling at higher speeds 20 
Abstract 21 
Improving the safety at passive rail crossings is an ongoing issue worldwide. These 22 
crossings have no active warning systems to assist drivers’ decision-making and are 23 
completely reliant on the road user perceiving the approach of a train to decide whether to 24 
enter a crossing or not. This study aimed to better understand drivers’ judgements regarding 25 
approaching trains and their perceptions of safe crossing. Thirty-six participants completed a 26 
field-based protocol that involved detecting and judging the speeds of fast moving trains. 27 
They were asked to report when they first detected an approaching train, when they could 28 
first perceive it as moving, as well as providing speed estimates and a decision regarding 29 
when it would not be safe to cross. Participants detected the trains ~2km away and were 30 
able to perceive the trains as moving when they were 1.6km away. Large differences were 31 
observed between participants but all could detect trains within the range of the longest 32 
sighting distances required at passive level crossings. Most participants greatly 33 
underestimated travelling speed by at least 30%, despite reporting high levels of confidence 34 
in their estimates. Further, most participants would have entered the crossing at a time when 35 
the lights would have been activated if the level crossing had been protected by flashing 36 
lights. These results suggest that the underestimation of high-speed trains could have 37 
significant safety implications for road users’ crossing behaviour, particularly as it reduces 38 
the amount of time and the safety margins that the driver has to cross the rail crossing.  39 
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1. Introduction 42 
Crashes between trains and road vehicles at rail level crossings are a substantial safety 43 
issue for road and rail operations. Such crashes accounted for 45% of the overall fatal rail 44 
incidents during 2014-2015 (Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator, 2015), although 45 
they accounted for less than 1% of the overall fatal road incidents in Australia (Bureau of 46 
Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics, 2014; Office of the National Rail Safety 47 
Regulator, 2015). The consequence of collisions between trains and road vehicles can be far 48 
greater than those between road vehicles. While crashes between trains and road vehicles 49 
are relatively infrequent, when they do occur, those involved are more likely to suffer fatality 50 
or serious injury (Australian Transport Council, 2010). That is, train and road vehicle crashes 51 
have higher per-crash casualty rates and are associated with a substantial economic cost of 52 
116 million AUD a year (Evans, 2013). The economic and importantly, the human costs of 53 
train and road vehicle crashes are clearly substantial and reducing these incidents is an 54 
important priority for both rail and road safety. On every day for the last ten years, 55 
approximately one person was fatally injured at level crossings in the European Union and in 56 
the United States, close to one was seriously injured in the EU, and three injured in the US 57 
(European Railway Agency, 2012b; Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety 58 
Analysis, 2016). These trends have not improved worldwide in the last decade. 59 
The intersection between road and rail and use of rail level crossings is common. For 60 
example, there are currently 23,500 rail level crossings in operation in Australia (Rail 61 
Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2015). Rail level crossings are typically categorised 62 
into two types of crossings based around the level of control at the crossing. Active 63 
crossings employ automatic devices (e.g., flashing lights, with or without boom gates) that 64 
are activated shortly before the arrival of a train and are designed to alert vehicle drivers of 65 
an approaching train and prevent them from driving through the crossing when the train is 66 
approaching. On the other hand, passive crossings employ static signage (e.g., cross bucks, 67 
‘give-way’, or ‘stop’ signs) and are designed to warn the driver of the possibility of an 68 
approaching train at any time, but require the driver to make the decision regarding whether 69 
it is safe to cross. The majority of rail crossings around the world are passively protected. 70 
Passive crossings represent 67% of public crossing in operation in Australia (Railway 71 
Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2009), 75% in the United States (National 72 
Transportation Safety Board., 1998), and 47% in Europe (European Railway Agency, 73 
2012a). Passive crossings are mainly located in rural areas, where train speeds are 74 
generally faster (e.g., Laapotti, 2015; Rudin-Brown et al., 2014). 75 
To ensure that a road user who is stopped at a passive crossing has sufficient time to safely 76 
traverse the crossing, a minimum sighting distance is required.  This sighting distance is the 77 
minimum distance at which an approaching train must be seen in order for the vehicle to 78 
proceed and clear the crossing by the required safety margin. This is calculated for each 79 
individual crossing taking into account its particular characteristics such as types of vehicles, 80 
geometry, and train speed (Standards Australia, 2015). In particular, the required sighting 81 
distance becomes greater with higher train speeds, where decisions regarding entering the 82 
crossing need to be taken when trains are at relatively long distances away from the driver. 83 
1.1 Factors Associated with Drivers’ Crossing Behaviours  84 
Collisions at level crossings tend to be the result of a combination of factors. Vehicle-related 85 
factors have been shown to be relatively uncommon in railway level crossing collisions and 86 
environment-related factors rarely occur in isolation from driver-related factors. Numerous 87 
train crash investigations have found that driver errors rather than deliberate violations are 88 
primarily responsible for train and road vehicle crashes (Baysari et al., 2009; Caird, 2002; 89 
Salmon et al., 2013). Observational studies of actual rail level crossings report that 57-77% 90 
of drivers will cross (the rail crossing) in the presence of an approaching train (Kasalica et 91 
al., 2012; Tey et al., 2011). Additionally, observational studies identify that the majority of 92 
drivers slow down and perform visual scanning behaviours as they approach the rail tracks, 93 
prior to crossing (Kasalica et al., 2012; Meeker and Barr, 1989). The obvious checking for 94 
the behaviour of trains exhibited by drivers supports the suggestion that perceptual errors 95 
rather than deliberate violations underlie many train and road user crashes.  96 
Several studies have found that short sighting distances and obstructed sighting lines are 97 
associated with train-vehicle crashes (Caird, 2002; Laapotti, 2015). Notwithstanding the 98 
issues associated with sighting distances, the ability of a driver to accurately perceive a 99 
moving train with clear and unobstructed sightlines is still an under-researched area at rail 100 
level crossing. Decision making related to gap acceptance is associated with sighting 101 
distances and the ability to perceive a moving train. This is the amount of time or distance 102 
that a driver judges acceptable to allow them to perform the crossing manoeuvre. Gap 103 
acceptance has been studied predominately in relation to road vehicles merging into the flow 104 
of traffic or driving through an intersection. These on-road and simulated driving studies 105 
have found that shorter time of arrival at a junction, smaller gap distance, and faster 106 
oncoming traffic speeds reduce the likelihood of a gap being judged to be acceptable and 107 
the driver not performing the manoeuvre (e.g., Beanland et al., 2013; Bottom and Ashworth, 108 
1978; Hunt et al., 2011). Similar results are reported by studies at rail level crossings where 109 
the perceived time of arrival of the train, the distance, and/or the train speed are associated 110 
positively with traversing a rail level crossing (e.g., Meeker and Barr, 1989; Meeker et al., 111 
1997; Tey et al., 2011). However, little research has examined gap acceptance in terms of 112 
when drivers perceive it safe (or unsafe) to cross a rail level crossing when a train is 113 
approaching. 114 
Another factor related to gap acceptance is the speed of an oncoming train. Underestimation 115 
of the speed of a train approaching a rail level crossing could put road users at risk of being 116 
involved in a crash (Leibowitz, 1985; Meeker et al., 1997). For an observer, the travelling 117 
speed of a large object typically appears slower than that of a smaller object travelling at the 118 
same speed: this is known as the size-speed illusion (Leibowitz, 1985) and has been 119 
confirmed using several rail simulator studies (e.g., Clark et al., 2013; Clark et al., 2016; 120 
Cohn and Nguyen, 2003).  121 
Field studies are critical to fully understand the ability to detect moving trains, accurately 122 
judge their oncoming speeds and hence make safe crossing decisions. While simulator or 123 
video-based studies provide some evidence regarding the difficulty of accurately detecting 124 
moving trains, the lack of a three dimensional visual perspective and the fact that factors like 125 
field of view, lighting and shading and other key variables cannot be accurately reproduced 126 
by these approaches limits the transferability of findings to the real world.  To date, only two 127 
studies have specifically examined drivers’ visual scanning behaviours at level rail crossing 128 
(i.e., Grippenkoven and Dietsch, 2015; Young et al., 2015). These studies focused on the 129 
approach to active rail level crossings in urban areas. They inform our understanding of 130 
visual search strategies of drivers that are approaching rail level crossings (i.e. where drivers 131 
look) but do not provide insight into the ability of drivers to accurately detect trains, estimate 132 
speeds or judge whether it is safe to cross (i.e. what they perceive).  133 
1.2 Aims and research questions 134 
The present research aimed to understand road users’ perceptions of approaching trains 135 
and their decisions relating to when it is no longer safe to enter a passive rail level crossing 136 
using a unique field-based paradigm. This study specifically answered the following research 137 
questions: (i) at what distance are drivers first able to detect trains and when they are 138 
moving?; (ii) are drivers capable of accurately estimating train speeds?; (iii) are drivers able 139 
to judge their own speed estimation performance?; and (iv) does drivers’ performance in 140 
detecting trains and their movement affect their decisions to enter level crossings? A novel 141 
methodology was developed to answer these research questions in a field study paradigm. 142 
2. Method 143 
2.1 Trial site 144 
The site selected for data collection was located on a rail maintenance track off Rennie St, 145 
Corio, Victoria, on the Werribee line between the Lara and Corio stations, in the State of 146 
Victoria, Australia. This site was selected from a number of potential sites because it 147 
provided a long straight rail track with visibility above the longest sighting distances required 148 
in Australia, relatively high train frequency during peak hours (3 tracks), and train speeds 149 
over 100km/h (see Figure 1). The site was located between two active level crossings, 150 
importantly, however, the level crossings were more than 2km away from the testing site and 151 
their active equipment could not be seen or heard by participants. The research team and 152 
the research participants were located further down the maintenance track off Rennie St (at 153 
the observation point in Figure 2), in order to ensure that the participants were not distracted 154 
by the nearby road traffic. 155 
 156 
Fig. 1. Left: the trial site, trains were approaching from the right of the track; top right: the faster train, 157 
a VLocity train; bottom right: slower train, a P class locomotive. 158 
 159 
Fig. 2. GoogleMaps top view of the trial site. The section of the track that could be seen by 160 
participants is demonstrated with the measurement bar along the length of the rail tracks. 161 
Visibility on one side was obstructed by bridges thus the site was appropriate for the study 162 
on one direction; only trains from Melbourne (i.e. west bound) were therefore included. On 163 
this side, the rail track was straight, and west bound trains could be seen as far as 2.5 km 164 
away (see  165 
Figure 2). The layout of the rail tracks allowed for trains travelling from that direction to 166 
always be visible in the unlikely case of multiple trains arriving at this location at the same 167 
time, with trains on this line travelling at speeds between 100 – 140 km/h. 168 
2.2 Observed trains 169 
Six trains were scheduled to pass the trial site during the study observation period (between 170 
13:45 and 16:40). The first two trains seen by participants were used as practice trials to 171 
become familiar with the site configuration and the study procedures. Data was not recorded 172 
during this practice phase. Following the two practice trains, four more trains were scheduled 173 
to pass through the trial site (referred to as Trains 1 to 4); these four trains were used for 174 
data analysis. Specifically, Trains 1, 2 and 4 were VLocity trains, which were faster trains 175 
running around 130km/h at the location of the study (see top right panel of Figure 1), while 176 
Train 3 was a P class locomotive and was a 20km/h slower train running at 110km/h at the 177 
site (see bottom right panel of Figure 1). 178 
2.3 Study design 179 
This field study involved high velocity trains in locations with high sighting distance. By 180 
nature, it was not feasible to observe more than four trains, as such trains are very 181 
infrequent. Therefore, the study design focused on specific context rather than train diversity 182 
and controlled for as many factors as possible (participant visual characteristics, lighting 183 
conditions, distraction). A repeated measures design was therefore used with train 184 
occurrence and multiple observation points per train as a within-subject factor. All 185 
participants completed one testing session, which included visual acuity testing, practice and 186 
test observations. In addition to the observational study, each participant completed a 187 
demographic questionnaire and a retrospective questionnaire. 188 
2.3.1 Visual acuity testing 189 
To ensure that drivers satisfied the visual requirements for an Australian driving licence, all 190 
participants underwent visual acuity tests in an established Optometry practice in Geelong. 191 
Visual acuity was assessed both monocularly and binocularly with participants wearing the 192 
spectacles/contact lenses that they normally wore for driving using a standard logMAR chart 193 
at a working distance of 3 metres. Participants were required to read the letters as far down 194 
the chart as possible, guessing was encouraged and scoring was on a letter by letter basis. 195 
Contrast sensitivity was measured in the same testing room using a Pelli-Robson chart at a 196 
working distance of 1 metre with a +1.00D lens used to correct for the working distance; 197 
scoring was as recommended on a letter by letter basis.  198 
2.3.2 Observations 199 
Participants were instructed to look for approaching trains from the East direction five 200 
minutes before a train was due. At that moment, a laser range finder was pointed toward the 201 
track and ready to measure train distance and speed (see left panel of Figure 1). When the 202 
train was 2.5km away, the laser range finder was activated for automated measurements of 203 
distance and speed every second. These measurements were recorded and used to 204 
estimate the time needed for the train to reach three pre-determined distances (1,100m, 205 
750m and 350m). These time estimates were updated at each new measurement obtained 206 
from the laser range finder.  207 
Participants reported the word ‘Train’ when they first saw the train, and this was immediately 208 
recorded by the research assistant on the smartphone app. As soon as the participant 209 
perceived that the train was moving they reported this with an estimate of the train speed 210 
(rounded to the nearest 10km/h). The observation of train movement was immediately 211 
recorded by the research assistant on the app, and then the speed estimate was recorded 212 
on an observation sheet. At the three additional pre-determined distances, the smartphone 213 
app sounded the phone’s alarm at which point the participant provided three additional 214 
speed estimates. Lastly, participants were requested to report the word ‘Unsafe’ when they 215 
considered that, when stopped at the entrance of a passive crossing, they would not 216 
traverse the level crossing due to the proximity of the approaching train. This was also 217 
immediately recorded on the smartphone by the research assistant. Once the train passed 218 
participants, they were requested to provide their confidence about the speed estimates they 219 
had provided. This process is summarised in Figure 3. The ambient illumination (referred to 220 
as lighting conditions in the remainder of the document) at the site was recorded in lux after 221 
each train, both in the vehicle and outside, and provided the range of ambient illumination 222 
observed during data collection as well as the variability of these measures between the 223 
different data collection days. 224 
225 
Fig 3. Participants’ activities as a train is approaching. 226 
2.3.3 Demographic questionnaire 227 
The demographic questionnaire assessed the participant’s driving background and relevant 228 
demographic information, such as age, gender, driving experience and experience with both 229 
active and passive rail level crossings (including near-miss incidents). 230 
2.3.4 Retrospective questionnaire 231 
The retrospective questionnaire asked participants to reflect on their performance during the 232 
trial. It covered participants’ changes in confidence during the trial. The confidence in their 233 
estimates of train movement detection and speed estimates was evaluated on a 7-point 234 
Likert scale with higher values indicative of greater confidence (from Extremely unconfident 235 
to Extremely confident, as described in Figure 7). Participants also responded to questions 236 
about how difficult they found detecting and judging the speed of the oncoming trains, as 237 
well as factors that might have influenced their ability to detect trains and judge their speed. 238 
2.4 Participants 239 
Participants were 36 healthy licensed adult drivers who were recruited from the general 240 
public in the Geelong region of Victoria, Australia (closest city to the trial location). Power 241 
calculation demonstrated that this sample size was required to attain a power of .9 at level 242 
alpha .05 with medium size effects .25 with a correlation among repeated measures of .5. 243 
Recruitment was stratified to obtain a participant population with an equal gender split and a 244 
variety of ages and driving experience. All participants were required to have habitual visual 245 
acuity (either with or without optical correction) that met Australian driving licensing 246 
standards of 6/12 binocularly. Ethical clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the 247 
QUT Human Ethics Committee (approval number 1500000219). 248 
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2.5 Materials 249 
2.5.1 Laser range finder 250 
A laser range finder was used to measure train distances and speed. The Newcon LRB 251 
4000 Cl laser range finder was used (see Figure 1) and set to record the distance and the 252 
speed of detected objects. The measuring range of this equipment was 20 to 4,000m, with 253 
an accuracy of +/- 1m. Speed measurements operated in the 5-400 km/h range, with an 254 
accuracy of +/-2km/h. Each of the measurements took up to 0.3s and was taken 255 
automatically every second. The output data were collected on a computer connected to the 256 
device via a RS232 port. The computer was used to trigger measurements without touching 257 
the device in order to avoid vibrations. The laser range finder was mounted on a Manfrotto 258 
475B digital pro tripod, with associated Manfrotto 128LP head. A heavy tripod was used in 259 
order to ensure that the device was in a stable position during testing.  260 
2.5.2 Smartphones 261 
Four Samsung S4 smartphones were used to record the participants’ responses when they: 262 
(i) first detected an approaching train; (ii) when they first judged that the approaching train 263 
was moving; and (iii) considered it was no longer safe to enter the level crossing (see Figure 264 
4). A fifth Samsung S4 smartphone was used to create a portable Wi-Fi hotspot, which 265 
created a network between the four other smartphones and the computer linked to the laser 266 
range finder. The data from the smartphones and the laser range finder was synchronised 267 
with the software RTmaps version 3.4.10. 268 
 269 
Fig 4. Graphical interface of the app developed to record participants responses 270 
2.6 Procedure 271 
Each session involved testing four participants simultaneously.  Participants were recruited 272 
from the general public through advertisement on local university job websites, 273 
advertisement to volunteer groups, and snowballing effects. Participants were individually 274 
instructed about the activities and procedures involved in the study. Participants who usually 275 
wore corrective lenses or spectacles for driving were asked to wear them during the study. 276 
Four participants were assigned to one of the four vehicles which were positioned side by 277 
side, 80cm apart, and staggered to provide a comparable view from each driver’s seat of 278 
approaching trains along the rail corridor. The participant sat in the driver’s seat and was 279 
accompanied by a research assistant who was seated in the passenger seat to record the 280 
participant’s responses on the smartphones. 281 
Five minutes before a train was due, the measurement equipment was started including: the 282 
smartphone apps (developed and used to record participants’ responses), the tripod-283 
mounted laser range finder in position to measure a trains distance and speed at a 284 
predetermined position, located 2km downstream from the participants and RTmaps (the 285 
software used to synchronise the data from all the devices used in this study). As the train 286 
approached the predetermined location, automated measurements from the laser range 287 
finder were triggered and occurred every second. The head of the tripod was turned when 288 
required to follow the movement of the approaching train. 289 
Between Trains 2 and 3, participants completed the demographic questionnaire. The 290 
retrospective questionnaire was completed after the last train (Train 4). 291 
2.7 Data Analyses 292 
Generalised Linear Mixed Models with log link to take into account the lack of normality of 293 
the sample data collected, and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) were used to 294 
analyse the data. Generalised Linear Mixed Models were run on R version 3.1.1 and 295 
MANOVAs were run on SPSS version 21. These analyses were used to evaluate the effect 296 
of train speeds and location of the train on the dependent variables. The main dependent 297 
variables were the detection distances at which the train was (i) first recognised as a train, 298 
(ii) judged to be moving; (iii) when the participants considered it was no longer safe to enter 299 
the level crossing; and (iv) the participants’ estimates of the train speed and their confidence 300 
in their estimates of train speed.   301 
3. Results 302 
3.1 Participant demographics 303 
The majority of participants (58.3%) held a full open licence with the remaining participants 304 
holding a Provisional licence (first 2 years of unsupervised driving).  A total of 20 males and 305 
16 females completed the study, representing 55.6% and 44.4% in each category 306 
respectively. The age of participants ranged between 18 and 63 years, with a mean age of 307 
30.4 years (SD=14.2). All participants had completed high school with approximately half 308 
having completed an undergraduate degree. The number of kilometres driven in a month 309 
recorded by participants ranged from 40 to 4,500km, with a mean of 1,162km (SD=981). 310 
Almost all (86.1%) participants had previously crossed an active rail level crossing with a 311 
frequency of once a month or more and two thirds of participants reported having previously 312 
crossed a passive railway crossing once a month or more. Over half of the participants said 313 
they used train travel once a month or more, with approximately one quarter using rail travel 314 
once a week or more. Two participants reported having previously experienced a near-miss 315 
at level crossings and six participants were aware of someone else who had an incident with 316 
a train at level crossings. 317 
3.2 Participants’ visual acuity 318 
The participants’ visual acuity and contrast sensitivity with spectacles/contact lenses if 319 
habitually worn for driving are shown in Table 1. The mean habitual visual acuity in the right 320 
eye was -0.16 logMAR, left eye -0.16 logMAR, and binocular was -0.18 logMAR. The mean 321 
contrast sensitivity was 1.96 log units, and the range of contrast sensitivity was 1.90 and 322 
2.05. These results demonstrate that participants had normal levels of visual acuity and 323 
contrast sensitivity and all met the visual acuity requirements for driving.   324 
Table 1 325 
Participants' visual acuity results 326 
Eye tests Mean Standard deviation Range 
Right visual acuity 
(logMAR) 
-0.16 .06 -0.26 to -0.06 
Left visual acuity 
(logMAR) 
-0.16 .05 -0.22 to -0.06 
Binocular visual acuity 
(logMAR) 
-0.18 .04 -0.20 to -0.08 
Binocular contrast 
sensitivity (log units) 
1.96 .08 1.90 to 2.05 
 327 
3.2 Lighting conditions 328 
Table 2 provides details of the lighting conditions. Light levels ranged between 900-19,000 329 
lux for measurement outside the vehicles, and 300-10,000 lux inside the vehicle at the 330 
driver’s position. The mean values typically decreased over the duration of the testing period 331 
within a given day and, the clear and bright conditions gradually reduced as the evening 332 
approached. Data was collected during clear weather conditions. 333 
Table 2 334 
Lighting conditions during observations 335 
  Lighting in vehicle (lux)  Lighting outside (lux) 
Train Time Mean (SD) Range  Mean (SD) Range 
T1 14:45 4,100 (1,872) 1,200-7,000  12,429 (4504) 7,000-19,000 
T2 15:20 2,833 (2,016) 500-7,000  8,656 (5890) 900-19,000 
T3 16:10 2,622 (2,288) 800-8,000  9,578 (6619) 1,500-19,000 
T4 16:42 1,868(3,308) 300-10,000  4,288 (6062) 900-19,000 
 336 
3.3 Detection of train and train position when it becomes unsafe to cross 337 
Given that data was collected with four participants at the same time, the vehicle and 338 
participant position in the vehicle was assessed to see if it affected the outcomes. No 339 
statistical differences were found in responses (p=.69 for vehicle 2, p=.30 for vehicle 3 and 340 
p=.06 for vehicle 4, where vehicles are numbered from left to right). Therefore, results from 341 
all participants are considered together regardless of which vehicle they were seated in 342 
when completing the study. 343 
Overall, trains were identified as a train by participants at an average distance of 2,149m 344 
(SD=306), with train movement being identified by participants at an average distance of 345 
1,644m (SD=411). Participants reported that it was no longer safe to enter a level crossing 346 
when the train was at a distance of 594m (SD=271) on average. The mean distances for 347 
each of the individual trains are presented in Figure 5. 348 
 349 
Fig 5. Average distance at which each individual test train was detected (green), judged as moving 350 
(orange) and reported as too close to safely enter the level crossing (red). Error bars represent 351 
standard errors. 352 
Statistical analysis conducted with Generalised Linear Mixed Models showed that while 353 
distances for Train 1 and 2 were similar, the third and fourth trains were both detected at 354 
longer distances (i.e. earlier). The first two trains were identified at an average distance of 355 
2,089m from the participant, while Train 3 was identified 169m sooner (t=2.46, DF= 95, 356 
p=.016), and Train 4 was detected 137m sooner (t=2.16, DF= 95, p=.034). It is possible that 357 
the difference for Train 3 is due to the fact that that train was different from the others, using 358 
a slower locomotive (see Figure 1). However, even if data from Train 3 is excluded - 359 
participants’ detection ability improved with practice, with detection 153m further in the last 360 
two trials (7% further for Trains 2 and 4 relative to Train 1).   361 
A similar analysis was performed for the distance where train movement was first detected 362 
and where participants reported it was no longer safe to cross. No improvement was 363 
observed for either of these variables with practice, and performance was consistent for the 364 
four different trains for the detection of train movement and the estimation of the location 365 
where it became no longer safe to enter a level crossing. 366 
Importantly, these averages mask large differences between participants, which can be seen 367 
in Table 3. This table presents percentiles of the average distances where the train was first 368 
perceived. This distance ranges between 1,347 and 2,526m. The table also presents 369 
percentiles of the distance where the train movement was detected, which ranged between 370 
821 and 2,384m; and the distance where participants reported it was no longer safe to cross 371 
– ranging between 205 and 1,411m.   372 
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Table 3 373 
Variability in performance between participants, as highlighted by the percentiles of train and train 374 
movement detections, and moment when it is no longer safe to cross. 375 
 Train detected  Train movement detected  No longer safe to  cross 
Percentile Distance (m) Time (s)  Distance (m) Time (s)  Distance (m) Time (s) 
0% 1,347 39  821 24  205 6.1 
15% 1,851 58  1,154 33  381 10 
50% 2,276 67  1,680 49  505 15 
85% 2,399 71  2,059 63  877 26 
100% 2,526 73  2,384 71  1,411 39 
 376 
Table 3 shows the time it would take the train to reach the crossing, calculated from the 377 
speed and distance of the train. This is of particular interest for the time when the 378 
participants reported it was not safe to enter the crossing. On average, participants reported 379 
they would no longer enter the crossing when the train was 17.0s away on average 380 
(SD=8.0), with values ranging from 6.1 to 39.4s. The large majority of participants (29), 381 
corresponding to 80.6% of the sample, would have entered the crossing at a time when the 382 
lights would have been activated if the level crossing had been protected by flashing lights 383 
(i.e. 24s before the train reached the crossing). It should be noted that 6 participants (17% of 384 
the sample) reported that it was no longer safe to enter the crossing when the train was less 385 
than 10s away.  386 
The eight participants who reported having experienced a near-miss or being aware of 387 
someone else who had experienced a near-miss were combined into a sub-group. Their 388 
responses regarding the detection of the train, its movement or the moment when it was 389 
judged no longer safe to enter the crossing were compared to the remaining participants. 390 
Statistical analyses did not highlight any significant difference for any of these dependent 391 
variables, therefore results from all participants are considered together. 392 
3.4 Participants’ estimates of train speed 393 
Participants consistently underestimated the speed of trains, with the exception of one 394 
participant who consistently overestimated train speed. In determining the level of 395 
underestimation in train speed this outlier was removed. Figure 6 demonstrates the mean 396 
km/h by which participants underestimated the train speed at each location and for each 397 
train. Overall, there was a significant main effect of Train Order [F (2.36,47.09) = 59.55, p 398 
<.001, Partial Eta2 = .75, ε = .79]; with post hoc analyses demonstrating that estimations 399 
were more accurate for the slower moving Train 3 than Trains 1, 2 and 4 (p<.001). No other 400 
comparisons were significant. There was also a significant main effect of Train Location (first 401 
seen moving, 1,100m; 750m and 350m) [F (1.53,30.57) = 19.17, p <.001, Partial Eta2 = .49, 402 
ε = .51], however post hoc analysis demonstrated that there was no significant difference 403 
between speed estimates when the train was first judged to be moving and at 1,100m away 404 
(p = .118). At these locations, errors of 47% and 41% were observed (averaging to 44%, as 405 
no statistical difference was observed). Participants became more accurate with their speed 406 
estimate as the train became closer. When the train was 750m from the participant 407 
estimates were significantly more accurate than when the train was first judged to be moving 408 
(p = .003) or at 1,100m from the participant (p <.001), with error rates decreasing to 36%. At 409 
350m, the mean speed estimate was significantly more accurate than at 750m (p=.015), 410 
1,100m (p =.001) and when the train was first seen to be moving (p=.001), with error rates 411 
decreasing to 29%. 412 
 413 
Fig 6. Mean km/h underestimation of train speed. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 414 
3.5 Participants’ confidence in their estimates of train speed 415 
Participants were asked how confident they were with their judgement that the train was 416 
moving and how confident they were with their speed estimates. Confidence ratings were 417 
made on a 7-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating more confidence in the 418 
estimate. Overall, the participants reported they were moderately confident that the train was 419 
moving; however, they were less confident, on average, with their estimation of the speed of 420 
the trains (see Figure 7). The participants’ confidence ratings that the train was moving and 421 
the confidence in speed estimates were compared across the different trains. Some 422 
departures in normality were present with the participants’ confidence reports and thus, non-423 
parametric Friedman ANOVAs were used. No significant differences were found with 424 
participants’ mean confidence ratings of the train is moving decision [χ2 (3) = 3.14, p = .37] 425 
and confidence of the speed decision [χ2 (3) = 6.17, p = .10] between trains. 426 
A further examination of the participants’ confidence in their speed estimates was performed 427 
using bivariate correlations to examine the relationships between participants’ confidence 428 
levels in their speed estimates and the actual level of underestimation of those speed 429 
estimates when they were the most accurate (i.e. when trains were 350m from the 430 
participants). Spearman’s rho bivariate correlations were performed due to the non-normal 431 
distributions of the data. The correlations between participants’ confidence and the level of 432 
speed underestimation for Train 1, 2, 3, and 4 were rrho = .16, p = .41, rrho = .31, p = .07, rrho = 433 
.31, p = .06, and rrho = .02, p = .92 respectively. Regardless of train speeds, participants’ 434 
confidence levels of their judgements were not correlated to their actual speed 435 
underestimation.  436 
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Fig 7. Mean confidence of train moving and train speed estimates for each train. Error bars 438 
represent standard error of the mean. 439 
3.6 Retrospective questionnaire 440 
The majority of participants (86.1%) reported that they had no difficulty detecting the trains. 441 
In contrast, four participants reported some difficulties detecting the trains; two of the four 442 
participants reported these difficulties were only with the initial train sighting and that it was 443 
easier to detect subsequent trains. The other two participants reported that their difficulty 444 
was due to “objects next to the track” or with “distinguishing lights of the railway line from the 445 
lights of the train”. Regarding the speed estimations, generally, all participants reported that 446 
estimating the speed of the train was easiest when the train was closest (i.e., 350m mark) 447 
and three quarters of participants (72.2%) found that speed estimation became easier as the 448 
study progressed. This however, was not confirmed by the analysis of the speed estimates, 449 
as no improvement was observed throughout the study. Paradoxically, two thirds of 450 
participants (63.9%) reported it was harder to estimate the speed of the slow train (i.e., Train 451 
3), even though their estimates of train speed for Train 3, were the least inaccurate overall. 452 
Nonetheless, three participants found it harder to estimate the speed of the fast trains and 453 
10 found the estimation of speed to be the same for both fast and slow trains. Overall, the 454 
study results suggest participants were not entirely accurate with their speed perception of 455 
fast travelling trains and the incongruity between the participants’ retrospective reports of 456 
task performance and their actual task performance was substantial. 457 
4. Discussion 458 
The current study examined drivers’ perceptual abilities at identifying Australian high-speed 459 
trains (100-140km/h). This included when the train was judged as moving as well as drivers’ 460 
decisions regarding gap acceptance for crossing manoeuvres in a field-based study. Data 461 
was collected for four participants at the same time, in four separate vehicles. No difference 462 
was observed due to the positioning of vehicles, which is not unexpected given that any 463 
advantage of a particular vehicle position is small: the furthest vehicle was 15m further away 464 
from the approaching trains than the closest vehicle, which was a small difference compared 465 
to the distances of interest in this research (hundreds of metres). The position of the vehicle 466 
was therefore not considered to be a confounding factor. 467 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Train 1 Train 2 Train 3 Train 4
C
on
fid
en
ce
 v
al
ue
Train number
Is moving Speed
7 Extremely confident 
6 Moderately confident 
5 Slightly confident 
4 Neither 
3 Slightly unconfident 
2 Moderately unconfident 
1 Extremely unconfident 
4.1 Detection of trains and their movements 468 
All participants could identify trains travelling at 100-140km/h at long distances, which were 469 
far beyond the longest sighting distances required at passive level crossing in Australia. It is 470 
possible that trains were easy to detect even at a distance because they had daytime 471 
running headlights (e.g., Cairney, 2003). Further, the distance that the participants first 472 
detected the presence of a train on the rail tracks increased after the second observed train, 473 
suggesting that the distance at which trains can be detected may be subject to practice 474 
effects. That is, the participants might have learnt where the trains were due to appear on 475 
the railway tracks in the distance, as well as the trains’ particular features (such as the 476 
headlights). 477 
This study has shown that the movement of oncoming trains is much harder to detect than 478 
simply perceiving the presence of a train in the distance. On average, the four trains were 479 
perceived as moving 1,644m away, which was on average 505m closer to the participant 480 
than when the trains were first perceived on the rail track. The present findings are 481 
consistent with previous research that has demonstrated that it is difficult to visually 482 
discriminate the movement of an approaching object, particularly when that object is a long 483 
distance away as the rate of change in the optical size of the object is initially quite small 484 
(Schiff and Oldak, 1990).  485 
Large variability was observed between participants for the detection of trains and their 486 
movement. The participant with the lowest performance identified that the train was moving 487 
at a distance of 821m, which is within the range of the longest sighting distances required at 488 
Australian level crossings (Standards Australia, 2015), demonstrating that drivers have the 489 
ability to detect trains before it becomes dangerous to enter a passively protected level 490 
crossing. At this distance, it would take approximately 23s for the faster VLocity train 491 
travelling at 130km/h to arrive at the rail level crossing. Should the level crossing have had 492 
an active level crossing device such as flashing lights installed, these lights would have 493 
activated one second earlier (i.e., 24s before the train reached the crossing) than the train 494 
would have been judged as moving for that particular participant.  495 
4.2 Accuracy of train speed estimations 496 
While participants were able to detect trains and their movement at the distances deemed 497 
safe to make an informed decision regarding whether to enter a passively protected level 498 
crossing, this study has demonstrated that participants were unable to accurately estimate 499 
train speeds at any of the distances investigated. Speed was underestimated by at least 500 
30% at all distances, and this underestimation was at its highest for the furthest distance, 501 
reaching 44%. The speeds reported by participants were similar to those of motorway traffic, 502 
suggesting that participants did not appreciate that trains can travel faster. Furthermore, this 503 
underestimation did not improve with practice (results are similar for the four trains 504 
observed). Speed estimations were more inaccurate at longer distances and for faster trains 505 
(130km/h versus 110km/h). Numerous studies that have examined either speed perception 506 
or the related concept of time-to-arrival of moving vehicles, have typically found speed 507 
estimates are inaccurate (Caird and Hancock, 1994; Meeker et al., 1997; Savage, 2006). 508 
Moreover, several studies have demonstrated that time to arrival estimates of approaching 509 
vehicles is increasingly poorer the further away the approaching vehicle is from the driver 510 
(Caird and Hancock, 1994; Schiff and Oldak, 1990). 511 
4.3 Self-assessment of speed estimations 512 
The present study demonstrates that participants’ level of confidence with their estimates of 513 
train speed was high, and not correlated with their actual level of underestimation/accuracy 514 
for identifying the speed of the train. 515 
4.4 Effects on decisions to enter level crossings and safety 516 
The present study demonstrates that participants largely underestimated the speed of trains. 517 
This means that drivers’ ability to assess their risk of traversing a passive crossing will be 518 
poor. In effect, when a driver erroneously believes they have sufficient safety margins to 519 
traverse the crossing because of an underestimation of the travelling speed of a train, they 520 
might cross with very limited safety margins (see Table 3). When stopped at a level crossing, 521 
participants seem to make decisions about entering the crossing as if they were at a road 522 
intersection, without appreciating that trains are very different (mass, ability to stop and 523 
change direction) and travel at different speeds. For example, six participants reported that 524 
they would enter the crossing when the train was less than 10s away. More generally, the 525 
majority of participants (80.6%) reported that they would enter the crossing during a time 526 
when flashing lights would be activated at an active level crossing. This underestimation of 527 
speed may go some way to explaining results from previous research, where a substantial 528 
proportion of drivers (57-77%) were observed to cross a passive rail level crossing when a 529 
train approached (Kasalica et al., 2012; Tey et al., 2011).  The decision a driver must make 530 
about when it is safe to cross will be influenced by how confident they feel about their 531 
perception of the train speed, which was shown in this study to be quite high, despite poor 532 
performance. This study has also shown that experiencing a near-miss incident at level 533 
crossings – or knowing someone who experienced such an event – did not make 534 
participants more cautious in terms of deciding when it is safe to enter the crossing. 535 
Potential solutions for improving safety at passive rail level crossings are limited. Certainly, 536 
rail authorities in Australia are constantly upgrading rail crossings across the network; 537 
however, it is impractical to upgrade all passive rail crossings to active rail level crossings 538 
due to costs incommensurate to the level crossing risk, as such crossings are very 539 
numerous, located in remote locations with no electricity and with low road/rail traffic. Thus, 540 
improved knowledge and/or behaviours of road users is a more appropriate countermeasure 541 
(e.g., Savage, 2006). It is unlikely that training drivers how to estimate train speeds would be 542 
beneficial as participants’ estimates of the trains speed did not improve with practice. In 543 
contrast, the ability to detect the presence of trains did improve with practice. Australian road 544 
rules require drivers do not enter a crossing when a train is approaching and there is a 545 
danger of collision, leaving the evaluation of the risk to the driver.  Therefore, training and 546 
education campaigns should consider informing drivers about the human limitations of 547 
accurately estimating oncoming train speeds and provide advice not to enter a level crossing 548 
when a train is visible. Additional signs could also be placed at passive rail level crossings to 549 
inform the driver that high-speed trains travel on this railway line and that speed estimation is 550 
typically more difficult with high-speed trains. These countermeasures could result in safer 551 
decision-making at passive level crossings. Indeed previous research has documented the 552 
increased safety effects (i.e., speed approach reductions) of additional signage at rail level 553 
crossings in both simulator (e.g., Lenné et al., 2011) and field-based studies (Ward and 554 
Wilde, 1995).  555 
4.5 Strengths and limitations 556 
The present study used a unique real-world field study design which was specifically 557 
designed to address the research questions. This approach overcomes many of the 558 
limitations faced by similar studies that have been conducted in simulators or with videos, 559 
which while being easier to conduct from a practical perspective, have limitations in terms of 560 
validity and generalisability. Importantly, this study involved the development of a completely 561 
novel methodology for the field evaluation of drivers’ perceptions of a trains presence and 562 
speeds and their decision-making at level crossings. These effects were assessed in a 563 
sample of licensed drivers, stratified across age, whose results highlighted the inaccuracy of 564 
their perceptions and decision-making. 565 
There were, however, some limitations of the present study that should be considered when 566 
interpreting the results. Participants were looking for trains over a longer period of time than 567 
is typical under normal driving conditions and were primed for the approaching trains – 568 
therefore the data represents that of an alerted driver and thus the driver’s capacity to 569 
correctly detect trains may be overestimated.  570 
In order to achieve adequate sighting distance, train speeds and train traffic, it was not 571 
possible to conduct the study at an actual passive level crossing due to safety and traffic 572 
flow considerations. Thus, the data was collected at the side of a rail track rather than an 573 
actual passive level crossing. Due to reduced train traffic and train variety in such 574 
environment, it was not feasible to collect data with a higher variety of train and train speeds, 575 
which would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of driver performance at 576 
level crossings. 577 
The purpose of this study was to explore for the first time perception and decision-making of 578 
drivers regarding approaching trains in a field-based setting. We included a stratified sample 579 
of participants to ensure representation of all ages of drivers up to 63 years old and who had 580 
normal levels of visual acuity, (which also met the visual requirements for driver licensing) 581 
and contrast sensitivity and were free of eye disease. The sample size of this study was not 582 
sufficient to evaluate the effects of age on drivers’ performance and decisions to enter level 583 
crossings. We have therefore not looked at this particular issue, which, while of interest, is 584 
outside the scope of this paper. 585 
In addition, the study was performed during clear weather conditions only; it is possible that 586 
different weather conditions or night conditions could result in different effects. 587 
Lastly, the study results cannot be generalised to passive crossings with give-way signs as 588 
all participants were in stationary vehicles during the study, or to other road users, such as 589 
truck drivers. 590 
4.6 Future directions 591 
Further studies should seek to address the present study’s limitations to better understand 592 
the effects these different factors might have on the visual performance and decision-making 593 
at level crossings. 594 
In particular, our study only considered drivers alerted to the approach of a train. Drivers 595 
stop at level crossings for short amounts of time, and may suffer from a range of distractions 596 
while driving (such as speaking with other passengers, phoning, and even looking for trains 597 
on the other side of the crossing). It would be of interest to understand how such effects 598 
reduce the performance that we found in this study.  599 
Given the specificities of trucks (longer vehicle frames and reduced acceleration capabilities) 600 
and the extended risk they face at level crossings compared to typical sedan, there are 601 
additional factors which need to be considered for truck drivers when crossing passive level 602 
crossings, and further research should evaluate how such factors affect the results 603 
presented in this paper. 604 
This study focused on passive crossings with stop signs. Passive crossings with give way 605 
signs present specific challenges (moving vehicle, sighting from a distance to the crossing) 606 
and driver performance for such crossing should also be investigated. This would require the 607 
development of a specific methodology. 608 
5. Conclusions 609 
The aim of the current study was to examine the accuracy of drivers’ perceptual ability in 610 
detecting the presence and movement of a train at a distance, and examine whether drivers’ 611 
performance in detecting trains affected their decisions to enter level crossings.  612 
Distance from which drivers are first able to detect trains and their movement 613 
The results demonstrated that participants were able to perceive a train at a distance of 614 
~2km and were able to determine that the train was moving after the trains had travelled 615 
approximately 500m towards the participants’ observation area. All participants were able to 616 
detect the train at distances that are considered by Australian Standards allow drivers to 617 
make safe decisions regarding entering the crossing.  618 
Drivers’ accuracy in estimating fast train speeds 619 
All but one of the participants underestimated the travelling speed of the trains and the 620 
magnitude of underestimation was greatest for the faster moving trains. The underestimation 621 
was always greater than 30 percent below the actual train speed. 622 
Drivers’ evaluation of their speed estimates 623 
The decision a driver must make about when it is safe to cross will be influenced by how 624 
confident they feel about their perception of the train speed. This study has shown that 625 
drivers were very confident in their speed estimates, despite poor performance by all drivers. 626 
Drivers’ decisions related to entering level crossings 627 
Overall, the underestimation of train speed combined with the lack of drivers’ knowledge 628 
about their inaccurate perceptions could have significant safety implications with road users 629 
crossing behaviours, with drivers entering level crossing with reduced safety margins. This 630 
was highlighted in this study by the fact that most drivers reported they would enter the 631 
crossing at a moment when it would have been activated if the crossing had active 632 
protections. Further research is needed to examine if drivers decision making at rail 633 
crossings can be improved and thus, increase the safety of both rail and road users. 634 
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